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Meso-Level Mechanisms and Micro-Level Foundations 
 
1. Social Structure and Macro-Level Outcomes 
 
In his paper, Daniel Little argues that meso-level properties (such as relational and structural ones) 
may explain social processes: “by referring to structures and mechanisms that are embodied at a 
level of organization higher than individual actors – organizations, ideologies, legislative systems, 
training regimes, wars”. But Little argues as well that: “we can legitimately refer to meso-level 
mechanisms as long as we are mindful of the microfoundations requirement”. In this brief note I 
will consider Little standpoint and discuss it in the light of analytical sociology literature (see 
Manzo 2010 for an informative analysis). 
With definitions ranging from those centering on population attributes (Blau 1994), on positional 
considerations (Sørensen 1998) and on social networks (Burt 1992), the idea of social structure is 
one of the most widespread concepts in the sociological debate, and both classical and 
contemporary sociology deal with the concept and its applications in a number of ways. For 
instance, Coleman (1974, 36 and 49) argued that in modern societies, social positions are the key 
element of social structure. They are endowed with identifiable properties (such as material and 
symbolic advantages, rights to act and power) independent of people’s characteristics. Positions: 
“exist prior to the interaction of individuals filling these positions” (Udehn 2001, 305) and produce 
important consequences for the explanation of many macro-level phenomena. The structural effect 
of position arises in two ways (Sørensen 1996, 1334): first, the location of people in a given social 
structure affects their micro-level parameters. In labour market research, for instance, the incentives 
structure of the internal markets affects workers’ efforts and skills. Second, positions create effects 
independently of the characteristics of individuals. As wages and rewards in a job are thus not 
determined by the incumbent’s individual resources and productivity, but by being attached to titles 
or positions (Petersen 2004, 30). We cannot properly explain many macro-level phenomena 
(inequality and distribution above all) without knowing about the properties of the positions people 
occupy. 
Human capital models link individual careers only to the positive effects of education and work 
experience on productivity and therefore do not consider the effect of social structure in terms of 
positions. In mechanisms parlance, human capital theory supposes that a change in skills generates 
a change in earnings and consequently creates the empirically observed association of variables 
(Sørensen 1999, 4). Human capital theory hence predicts concave career lines with respect to the 
time axis (Hedström 2004). Sørensen’s well-known contribution has been to add to the human 
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capital equations other parameters of structural kind, which sum up the vacancy creation process 
inside the organizational system. In the human capital equation (i) Y(max) is the maximum career 
level reached and Xi are human capital resources. 
 
 [i] Y(max) = d0 + d1x1 + d2x2 +..dixi.. + dnxn 
 
Sørensen transforms equation [i] into the model [ii]: 
 
[ii] Y(t) = [(c0 + c1x1,+ c2x2 +…cixi +…cnxn) / b] (ebt –1) + y(0)ebt. 
 
This model expresses the idea that a certain status Y(t) depends on the initial position y(0), on the 
length of time in the system S, on the human capital resources and on the career opportunities 
generated inside the system. This structural effect is included in the parameters b. Petersen 
summarizes the vacancy competition model as follows (2004, 30): 
(1) There is a fixed occupational structure, characterized by a distribution of jobs; 
(2) Opportunities to get ahead will be determined by the rate at which vacancies in the occupational 
structure open up, through turnover, job creation, and more; 
(3) People differ in the job-relevant resources they possess (e.g. human capital, experience), which 
help them compete for positions in the occupational structure; 
(4) People want to get ahead in the structure (the action part); 
(5) The rate at which opportunities to get ahead in the occupational structure open up varies 
systematically between demographic groups. 
Points 1-2-5 specify structural properties, while points 3-4 define individual-level properties. Of 
course “structural opportunities” and “positions” as such do nothing: they per se do not generate, 
transform, produce or change anything. The role played by structural properties does not entail an 
ontological causal power autonomous and independent from the micro-level causality (Hedström 
2005).  
 
2. Are meso-level properties causally generative? 
 
The previous example leads to the difference between causally relevant and causally generative 
properties. Following critical realism, causal statements are of two kinds: claims about the objects 
and events that produce effects and claims about the properties of or facts about these objects and 
events that are relevant to these effects (see Glennan, 2002). The former have to do with verbs such 
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as: generate, transform, produce, change and it depends on action-like mechanisms; while the latter 
means influence, affect, shape, impact and concern socio-structural dimensions, both at the macro-
micro and micro-macro level. This distinction is in line with analytical sociology for which 
generative causes must be events rather that facts or states, but where social structure is for sure 
causally relevant for the explanation (Hedström 2005). This is crystal clear in diffusion studies, 
where different structural conditions (e.g. diffusion space, network interdependence) have – ceteris 
paribus – different consequences for the macro-level outcome. In the same line, Lewis outlined a 
difference between action-based processes which are adequate to understand generative causation 
and structural-based accounts which are causally relevant but not causally generative (2000, 263-
265). 
Manzo and Opp argue (this volume) that Little examples actually confirm that meso-level 
mechanisms work only through micro-level processes. And even a sympatethic commentator as 
Sewell (this volume), says: “Although I agree with Little, it seems to me that his account of meso 
and macro causation remains potentially vulnerable to critique from the analytical sociologists’ 
position. They could respond that scholars like the above, in spite of the high quality of their work 
and the general persuasiveness of their arguments, have in effect abbreviated their explanations by 
tacitly assuming a set of individual-level processes that are in fact necessary to truly account for the 
claimed causal connections”. It would be acceptable to disregard micro-level events (e.g. actions 
and interactions) only if macro-level processes are law-like, but as Opp states: “This is the general 
problem of assigning causality on the macro level: there are no laws that could be applied”.  
If not causally generative, meso and macro-level accounts are altough causally relevant for 
explanatory purposes. In the realist perspective adopted by analytical sociology, causation is the 
activity of forceful particulars at work. Particulars are causal agents because it is the activity of 
particular things that actually brings about changes in the world (Lewis 2000, 253-255; Porpora 
2008). Accordingly, we cannot speak of causal activities without at the same time referring to 
entities that are ontologically provided with causal power. In sociology, (inter)actions are the main 
causal activities, and the actors are the entities who produce the changes needed to generate – 
through mechanisms that are to varying degrees (counter)intuitive and (non)linear – social 
phenomena. As it has been stressed: “The causal efficacy of actions would be readily seen if we 
were able to press a pause button that suddenly froze all individuals and prevented them from 
performing any further actions. All social processes would then come to an immediate halt” 
(Hedström 2005, 36). But micro-level generative mechanisms produce their effect through non-
individual properties which are causally effiacious, among the most important of which are 
relational properties (cf. Hedström 2005, chapter 4). Likewise, relational properties are crucial to 
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the realist explanation in sociology (Porpora 2008). Not considering relational properties leads to 
the typical fallacy of  atomistic individualism and reductionism (Granovetter 2005). The role played 
by relational properties, in any case, does not entail assigning a causal power that is autonomous 
and independent of the role of the actions involved. This does not mean that the “social structure” 
has no causal relevance. If the social structure – to produce effects in the world – must pass through 
the power of human actions, the same actions taking place in different structural contexts generate 
different effects (Jepperson and Meyer 2011). Thus, thought social structure is not appropriate for 
illustrating and understanding the processes of generative causation, nevertheless it is causally 
efficacious and relevant for explanatory purposes (Lewis 2000, 264).  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
As far as the social ontology of generative explanation is concerned, analytical sociology is in 
“solid groud” (Little, this volume), because: “social entities, processes, and causal powers always 
depend on the actions and thoughts of individual actors.  Therefore we need to always be able to 
“cash out” a claim about causal relations and powers in terms of the features of individual agency 
that constitute those relations and powers.  This is what I refer to as “microfoundationalism,” and it 
is a valid requirement on social theorizing”. But this ontological claim does not entail a contention 
about the theoretical primacy of the micro-level upon “structural” level of analysis, both social-
organizational and institutional (Jepperson and Meyer, 2011, 66). We can take the well-known 
“strength of weak ties” argument advanced by Granovetter (1973), which demonstrates how social 
structure influences information flows over and above individual level properties. The 
microfoundation of the strenght of weak ties argument is trivial: it provides an ontological grounds 
through which social structure affects the social world, but it does not add much in theoretical 
terms. Or consider institutions as : “chronically reproducing complexes of routines, rules, roles, and 
meanings. They have organizational aspects—structures of authority and responsibility, often 
integrated in something like control systems. They also have cultural aspects—generalized models 
formulating and justifying rules, built up into systems of thought and analysis (legal models, 
political models, religious models, knowledge systems, professional discourses) (Jepperson and 
Meyer, 2001, 64). Cultural and organizational aspects per se do not generate, transform, produce or 
change anything without affecting the micro-level of actions and interactions (ontological truism), 
but this should not deny their causal or explanatory relevance. To evoke social complexity, 
emergence and multi-level processes risks to be a mere re-statement of the problem of social theory 
rather than a basis for explanation (Felin, Foss, and Abell, 2011). 
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Why bother about the micro-level then? Because, even when structural dimensions make the 
theoretical added value it’s a micro-level (trivial!) translation that help to select the structural or 
institutional dimensions key for the explanation. Without a micro-level translation, in other words, 
the introduction of structural factors is elusive. Does social structure provide influence or 
information to people? Does it affect opportunity, beliefs, values or preferences? Furthermore, 
people interpret roles and rules reflexively and this enactment may prove key in the explanation. On 
the whole, if a microreduction would be unfit for sociology, a microfoundation would rather 
improve its precision and would allow to specify better the structural elements of explanation and 
their relevance for the social world (Coleman 1990).  
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